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ABSTRACT
This paper argues, first, that most housing problems—in Boston and throughout the
nation—are ultimately the result of the squeeze between inadequate incomes, on the
one hand, and the cost of profitably providing housing on the other. It is also argued
that housing cost and incomes together are the most decisive determinants of the over-
all quality of life of families and communities. Third, it is contended that the long
history of inadequate attempts to cope with the affordabiiity problem have noz only
failed to solve the problem, but have indeed contributed significantly to the broader and
serious problems of the overall economy, with resultant impact on Boston's budget,
employment, and other vital areas, as weil as its housing market.
The principal policy implications which follow from the analysis are, correspond-
ingly, of three types. First, housing policies—at the local as well as at the state and
national levels—must be coupled with and include policies for increasing and redistribu-
ting income. Second, housing policies must be formulated with explicit recognition of
and attention to their potential to affect the quality of life far beyond just the goal of
providing more affordable shelter for the residents. Third, there can be no solution to
the housing affordability problem without a solution to the broader political and econo-
mic crisis, but at the same time there can be no solution to the broader problems that
does not deal with the roots of the housing crisis.
The housing affordabiiity problem in Boston is examined quantitatively through
the lens of a concept called "shelter poverty"—a sliding scale of affordabiiity based on
the interaction among incomes, shelter costs, and non-shelter expenditures. It is
demonstrated
,
using this concept, that a family of four in Boston would need an income
of at least $23,000 to be able to afford the median-priced unsubsidized, two-bedroom
apartment available in the city in 1983, while an elderly couple would need an income
of nearly $12,000 to be able to afford the median-priced one-bedroom apartment.
Nearly one-third of the households in Boston are shelter-poor, most of them renters and
most with incomes of under $10,000 a year.
A set of policy proposals are presented for beginning to deal in an appropriate way
with the housing affordability problem in the city. While the structural changes
required to truly solve the problem must occur nationally, local policies aimed at both
the income and housing cost side of the problem can begin to make an impact in Boston
while possibly serving as models for larger-scale reform. Because of fiscal constraints
and continued skepticism about the efficacy of traditional spending programs, the pro-
posed policies focus primarily on institutional change rather than major expenditures.
They include suggestions for enhancing the income prospects and employment situations
of lower-income Bostonians, as well as proposals for altering some aspecis of the
structure and dynamics of the local housing market.
Finally, it is argued that Boston—especially through its new city administration-
has the potential to exercise great leadership and initiative nationally for a new
understanding of the nature and causes of the housing problem, and thus for new kinds
of policy directions for effectively addressing this profound problem of our city and our
society.
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The Nature of the Housing Problem
Most housing probiems can be logically or historically traced to the problem of
aifordability—to the squeeze between incomes on the one hand ana housing costs on the
other. To be sure, not all housing probiems are simply reducible to the aifordability
squeeze. In particular, discrimination in housing has a dynamic of its own: restricted
housing opportunity for oppressed peooie and groups is in part an affordabiiity problem
resulting from lower incomes caused by discrimination in education and employmem,
but clearly there is housing discrimination that is not reducible to income differences.
In addition, some problems associated with or growing out of the design of housing are
the result of certain assumptions and conventions about household structure and com-
position, the role of household members—most particularly the role of women—and
cannot be fully understood in terms of cost or affordabiiity constraints. Nevertheless,
most other familiar aspects of the housing problem—including problems of physical
condition and space, security of tenure, community viability, the amount, type and
location of new construction, and the allocation of public and private financial
resources to housing, i.e., not just the obvious cost problems of rents, utilities, taxes,
interest rates and sales prices—are ultimately traceable to the squeeze between
incomes and housing costs.
Several aspects of the relationship betwen incomes and housing costs are impor-
tant to understand. First of all, interaction between incomes and housing costs is
fundamentally different from the relationship between incomes and the cost of any
other necessity of life. Indeed, income on the one hand and housing costs on the other
are the two most decisive determinants of the living standard of most households. Why
should this be so? Housing is physically quite different from other consumption items:
it is large, durable, tied to location, and generally must be purchased as a complete
dwelling unit, not as a shopping basket of separately selected items (like rooms, facili-
ties, amenities, location) in the way that food and clothing are purchased. And because
housing is not literally consumed the way that food is, and thus is not purchased anew
on a regular and frequent basis, once a household begins to consume the services of a
particular dwelling it is relatively hard to alter the amount the type of housing services
consumed; that is, it is much harder to move than tc, say, switch food stores or food
items cr defer buvin^ new clothing. What this means is that the amount that we have
to pay for housing tends to be rather rigid and inflexible. Housing costs thus tend to
represent the first claim en the disposable income of a household. Everything else
generally has to fit into what is left of the income after paying for housing. To be sure,
in extreme emergencies people are going to buy food to stay alive even if it means not
meeting their housing expenses, but in general people adjust their other expenditures to
fit the constraints of the housing costs and incomes rather than adjusting their housing
costs to fit their other expenses.
Furthermore, because of the bulkiness of housing, its immobility, its attachment
to land, when one purchases housing s/he is not just obtaining the services of the dwell-
ing, but the advantages and disadvantages of the location, in terms of social environ-
ment, physical environment, accessibility, municipal services, and so forth. The amount
that a household can and does pay for housing thus determines the entire environment in
which they live—not just the quality of their dwelling unit—in a way that is unmatched
by any other consumption expenditure, even food and medical care.
A New Affordability Scale
The conventional view of the housing affordability problem is based upon a certain
notion of how much people reasonably can be expected to pay—namely, the famous 25
percent of income rule-of-thumb. Even this rule-of-thumb is subject to various
adjustments and interpretations, depending upon one's point of view and one's political
position. For a time, analysts and policymakers thought 20 percent was appropriate,
and now 30 percent is becoming the arbitrary rule that is being applied.
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What I would like to show is why any particular percentage, regardless of what it
is, does not make sense, whether it be 10, 20, 30, rather than 25 percent. I do not mean
to suggest, though, that it is impossible to arrive at a quantitative standard of
affordabiiity. Indeed, the above analysis of the distinctive nature of housing costs
provides a logical basis for developing such a quantitative standard, and it is a sliding
scale of affordabiiity. *
Imagine two households of comparable disposable (i.e., after-tax) incomes. Sup-
pose that one is a single person, while the other is a singie parent with five children.
What would be the difference in the cost of non-sneiter necessities of life based upon
some specified level of adequacy for these necessities? Obviously the large household
would need substantially more for its non-shelter necessities than would the small
household to achieve comoarabie material quality of life. This implies that a larger
household can afford to spend less for housing—if they are to meet their non-sneiter
needs at the given level of adequacy—than can the small household.
That is, the conception that there is a maximum amount which a household
reasonably can be expected to pay for shelter is perfectly plausible, for it recognizes
the special significance of housing costs. It says thai because housing costs are large
and inflexible and because they generally make the first claim on income, if a household
pays too much for shelter, they won't have enough money left to pay for other necessi-
ties. But there simply is no single percentage of income that can transcend differences
among households of various sizes. In general, for a given level of income, smaller
households can afford to spend more money and hence a higher percentage of income
for housing than can larger households.
Similarly, if you were to take two households of the same size, but different
after-tax incomes, then both would need to spend about the same amount to achieve the
same standard of living in terms of their non-shelter items. The higher income
household thus could afford to spend more housing, as a percentage of income as well as
in dollars.
Summarizing the results of this logic without yet discussing the question of a
standard of adequacy for non-shelter items: a small household with a given income can
afford to spend more than a large household of the same income: while a household of a
given size can afford to a higher Droportion of income for shelter as its income rises.
That is an appropriate standard of affordability for housing is a siiJlr.g scale, with
household size and income as the principal variables, factors or parameters which
determine where on the scale a household lies. Any attempt to reduce affordability of
housing to a single percentage of income—no matter how low or high—simply does not
correspond to the reality of fundamental and obvious differences among households.
Even attempts to establish a few prototypical groups and have a somewhat different
percentage for each, or set up narrow ranges in order to recognize some differences,
fail to grapple in a logically sound way with. the range of variation in what housenolds
really can afford to pay.
Most households do not, of course, pay what they realistically can afford to:
many pay more, while some pay less. In doing so, though, they are not simply choosing
freely among limitless opportunities. Since housing is a necessity, is costly, and its cost
is inflexible and generally represents the first claim on households' disposable income,
after paying for their shelter many people simply cannot adequately meet their non-
shelter needs. I have labelled such a state "shelter poverty," a situation which does not
refer to inadequate housing, but rather to deprivation of non-shelter necessities
resulting from the squeeze between incomes and housing costs.
How then can the sliding scale of affordability and the shelter poverty concept be
operationalized? In order to do so, it is necessary to determine what constitutes a
minimum level of adequacy for non-shelter items and what would be the cost of
achieving this minimum level, recognizing that the cost will certainly be different for
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each size household and will change over time as prices change; it will also vary geo-
graphically with climate and price differences, although geographical averaging is
possible.
I have used the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Lower Budgets for determining the
cost of non-shelter necessities at a minimum level of adequacy. 2 Utilizing the costs
from the Lower Budgets, scaled for various size households, and taking into account
income taxes and social security taxes, I have operationaiized the sliding scale oi
affordability developed above. Figures 1 through 3 present the scale for Boston for
1933. They reveal, for example, that in 1933 on average a family of four with a gross
income of under $21,500 could not afford as much as 25 percent for shelter; indeed, if
their income is under $14,000, they cannox afford anything for shelter and still meei
their non-shelter necessities at the minimum level specified by the BLS Lower Budget.
One-person, elderly households, on the other hand, can afford 25 percent for shelter at
an income of about $4,300, and a greater percentage at higher incomes (if they have
full medical insurance), but six-person households need incomes of nearly $38,000 to be
able to afford 25 percent of income.
Shelter Poverty in Boston^
In order to determine the extent and distribution of shelter poverty among Boston
households, it is necessary to match the sliding scale of affordability against actual
housing expenditures. Since the most recent data on such expenditures are from 1980,
the analyst has to use the 1980 affordability scale rather than the 1983 scale presented
in Figures 1-3.
What this analysis reveals is that mere than 5S y5Q0 renter families—37 percent of
all renter households in Boston—were shelter poor in 1980 (see Table 1). Among those
renters with incomes of under $10,000, over 45,000 families (59 percent) were shelter
poor.
TABLE 1
PERCENT OF RENTER FAMILIES
SHELTER POOR
BOSTON
SPRING 19S0
INCOME FAMILY SIZE
1-
-PERSON 2--PERSON 3-PERSON ^-PERSON 5-PERSON 6+-PERSON TOTAL
< $3k 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
5 3k - 7'< 51 94 100 100 100 100 71
$ 7k- 10k 4 44 92 100 100 100 31
TOTAL $I0;< '40 74 9S 100 100 100 59
$10k- 15k 4 29 Z7 100 100 16
$15k- 20k 6 33 93 7
$20k - 25k 3
$25k +
TOTAL 23%
Row %: Shelter
Poverty 37%
Row %: All
Renters 57%
36%vo
19%
19% 10%
55%
10%
7%
84% 89% 37%
10% 7% 100%
4% 3% 100%
SOURCE: BASED UPON RESULTS OF THE BOSTON HOUSEHOLD SURVEY, CONDUCTED
FOR THE B.R.A. BY CENTER FOR SURVEY RESEARCH, 1980.
Total number of renter-occupied units in 1980 was 158,215; the number under $10,000 was
76,497, 1980 Census of Population and Housing . Census Tracts, Boston, Mass., SMSA,
Table H-8.
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Sheiter poverty is thus a pervasive problem in this city. Yet the quantification of
housing af fordabiiity in this way cannot be said to exaggerate the problem, for compar-
ing the incidence of shelter poverty with the extent of househoids paying 25 percent or
more of income for shelter, we find that 50 percent of all renter households — and 7k
percent of renters under $10,Q00--were paying 25 percent or more in 19S0.
Although the shelter poverty approach reveals a less extensive aifordability prob-
lem in the aggregate than the traditional 25 percent measure, the shelter poverty prob-
lem is best revealed by household size. Thus, while 37 percent of all renter families in
Boston were shelter poor in i98Q, just 26 percent of one- and two-person househoids
were shelter poor, by contrast, 61 percent oi three- and four-person renter families and
84 percent of five-or-more-person families were shelter poor.
At the same time, though, 76 percent of all renter households in Boston have just
one or two persons, so that even though only about one-quarter were shelter poor in
19S0, they accounted for 56 percent (33,000 households) of the shelter poor renter
households in the city. On the other side, five-or-more-person renters were just seven
percent of ail renter families, but those shelter poor accounted for 17 percent (10,000
househoids) of the shelter poor renters; while three- and four-person renter families
were 17 percent of all renters, those shelter poor were 29 percent (17,000 households)
of all shelter poor renter households in Boston in 1980.
It is also useful to examine the extent of shelter poverty in terms of the number
of individuals affected rather than just families (see Table 2). Although most renter
families have just one or two persons, as mentioned above, and thus account for most of
the shelter poor families, the higher rate of shelter poverty among larger families
means that the percentage of individuals living in shelter poverty is rather higher than
that of families. Thus, 50 percent of the people living in renter families were shelter
poor in Boston in 1980, even though just 37 percent of the families themselves were
8-
TABLE 2
PERCENT OF INDIVIDUALS IN RENTER FAMILIES
SHELTER POOR
BOSTON
SPRING 19S0
INCOME FAMILY SIZE
[-PERSON 2-PERSON 3-PERSON 4-PERSON 5-PERSCN 6+-PERSON TOTAL
< $3k 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 10C
$ 3k- 7k 51 94 100 100 100 100 85
5 7k- 10k L 44 92 100 100 100 55
TOTAL $10k 40 7!+ s$ 100 100 100 75
$10k- 15k 4 29 87 100 100 35
$15k- 20k 6 33 17
•yi.-JrS "• ZJ>K -J 3
$25k +
TOTAL 23% 36% 66% 55% 84% 89% 50%
Row %: Shelter
Poverty 14% 15% 22% 15% 19% 15% 100°-c
Row %: All
Renters 30% 20% 16% 14% 11% 9% 1009c
SOURCE: BASED UPON RESULTS OF THE BOSTON HOUSEHOLD SURVEY, CONDUCTED
FOR THE 3.R.A. BY CENTER FOR SURVEY RESEARCH, 1980.
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sheiter poor; and 75 percent of individuals in renter families with incomes under
$10,000, while just 59 percent of such families, were shelter poor.
Shelter poor people in families of three or more accounted for nearly half of all
individuals living in shelter poverty (among renters), even though only one-third of all
renters lived in families of three or more. An individual in a renter family of five or
more is nearly four times as likely to be shelter poor as a single-person renter.
Unfortunately, the housing cost data for homeowners is for owners of single-
family houses only, so it is not possible to determine precisely the extent of shelter
poverty among Boston homeowners. It is possible to make a rough estimate, chough,
utilizing a breakdown of income vs. household size among homeowners. If a homeowner
family of a given size and income is as likely to be shelter poor as a rente- family of
the same size and income, then 2^9S of Boston homeowner families are shelter poor,
including 66% of homeowner families with incomes under $10, COO. In numerical terms,
since there were about 65,000 owner-occupied units in the city in 1980, this would sug-
gest that nearly 16,000 homeowners were shelter poor in 19S0. Of course, long-term
owners of a given size and income are probably somewhat less likely to be shelter poor
than equivalent renters, but more recent buyers are more likely to be shelter poor than
renters of the same income and household size, so this estimate has some uncertainty in
both directions. Conservatively, though, it can be said with considerable confidence
that at least 12,000 homeowner families in 3oston are shelter poor.
With over 5S,000 shelter poor renter families and at least i 2,000 shelter poor
homeowners in Boston, there are more than 70,000—one-third of the city—families
faced with a squeeze between their incomes and housing costs that leaves insufficient
resources to meet their other basic needs adequately.
Another, more current, view of the affordability problem of people seeking
housing in Boston may be obtained by looking at ads for private rental units. While
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advertised rents tend to be somewhat higher than rents paid in occupied units, the data
are still quite useful.
The results of a survey of nearly 2,700 apartment ads that appeared in the Boston
Sunday Globe early in 1983 are summarized in Table 3. Of these, 56 percent were for
one-bedroom units, with median rent of almost $400 a month: 37 percent were two-
bedroom, with median rent of $535; six percent were three-bedroom, with median of
$630; and only slightly over one percent were four-or-mcre bedroom, with median of
$730 a month.
Virtually no units are available in the private market for under $250 a month, and
of those between $250 and $400 a months nearly ail have just one bedroom. For fami-
lies with children, there is thus a dual problem of non-avaiiabiiity and non-affordability.
The distribution of private market rents by unit size can be matched against the
housing affordabiiity scale in Figures 1-3 to get a fuller picture of the income/housing
cost dilemma (see Figures '4-6). Households of one or two persons need an income of at
least $11,000 to be able to afford the median-priced one-bedroom unit for rent in
3oston in 1933; if they are below $3,000, nothing is affordable in the private market.
Three- and four-person households need over $21,000 for the median-priced twc-bed-
room unit; if their income is below $17,000 nothing is affordable. Most dramatically,
five-or-more person households need at least $34,000 a year in income to be able to
afford the median-priced three-bedroom apartment, and below $26,000 can afford none
of the few available units.
For large households especially the immense affordabiiity gap, along with the
related scarcity of units, reveals the utter incapacity of the private housing market to
solve the housing problem.
RENT
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TABLE 3
PRIVATE UNITS FOR RENT
BOSTON
WINTER 1983
1-BEDROOM 2-BSDROC.M 3-BEDROOM 4+-3EDROOM TOTAL
150- 199 0.5% 0% 0% 0% 0.1%
200- 2^9 1.3 o.s
250- 299 9.3 1.0 0.6 5.6
300- 349 16.3 3.S 1.2 10.6
350- 399 24.3 6.S 2.5 G 16.2
400- 449 14.5 12.5 3. 7 6.5 13.0
450- 499 9.3 13.7 7.4 12.3
500- 549 7.3 10.2 S.O 8.4
550- 599 4.3 1 -> ? 3 .
6
7.7
600- 699 5.5 10.9 21.6 22.6 3.7
700- 799 2.7 7.7 12.4 25.8 5.4
S00- 899 1.6 3.8 6.2 22.6 2.9
900- 999 0.8 2.1 3.7 1.5
1,000-1,099 0.5 2.2 4.3 3.2 1.4
1,100-1,199 0.6 1.3 0.6 0.9
1.200 + 0.7 6.7 19.1 19.3 4.3
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
MEDIAN $397 $535 $683 $781 $465
% Distri-
bution 55.9% 36.8% 6.1% 100%
The Causes and Consequences of the Housing Problem
Tne housing affordability problems arises from an inherent conflict or contradic-
tion between two of the most basic institutions of capitalist society— the labor market
and the housing market. Most people have to work for wages or salaries in order to
obtain the necessities of life, but despite the real and substantial increase in average or
per capital real incomes over the past hundred years due to rising productivity, union
organizing, political action, and intensive exploitation of other parts of the world, the
inescapable pressure on employers to hold down costs in order to compete and maximize
profits means that the labor market essentially exerts a downward pressure on wages, in
no way guaranteeing any family that it will nave sufficient income to pay ior adequate
shelter and other necessities.
On the other side, the cost of housing in the market is determined by the inter-
action of the costs of land, production, financing, marketing, operation, and, in most
instances, repeated resale and refinancing. The cost of housing thus bears no direct
relationship to people's incomes, i.e., to their ability to pay. But since housing is a
necessity which few peopie in this country can provide directly for themselves by build-
ing log cabins or mud huts, the need to be able to purchase housing and also obtain the
other necessities of life impeis the struggle for higher wages. The housing market thus
tends to exert an upward pressure on wages in opposition to the pressures of the labor
market. And since housing costs are particularly decisive in determining the standard
of living of every household, the conflict between the housing and labor markets is par-
ticularly acute and much more profound than the relationship of any other necessity to
the labor market.
Although the squeeze between incomes and housing costs is an inescapable fact of
life for large numbers of people in our society, it is not a problem which can be ignored,
for the limit on incomes tends to undermine the profitability of the housing market and
all of its related industries, the upward pressure on wages tends to squeeze the profit-
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ability of employers in general, and the aifordability squeeze on so many families is a
potential source of unrest and political instability. Thus, over the course of this
country's history there have been a variety of reactions, responses and interventions to
cope with the housing affordabiiity problem without altering the basic institutions of
our economic system.
I have analyzed this history elsewhere, with particular attention to the relation-
ship between housing and the unfolding economic crisis of the past two decades," There
is not the space to repeat the analysis here, but since the policy directions I am pro-
posing can only be understood fully in terms of it, 1 will very briefly summarize the
main points of the argument.
The principal developments in the housing system in the twentieth century—and
especially since the 1930's~have been the growth of the mortgage system and the
extensive intervention of the government. On the one hand, these efforts have been
defensive. Mortgage lenders and the government—primarily through the promotion of
mortgage homeownership and, to a much lesser extent, through subsidies for the
production of rental housing—have attempted to relieve some of the pressure on the
housing and labor markets and defuse the problem socially and ideologically so that it
does not become a source of radical political consciousness and action. At the same
time, government action has sought to stimulate profits and capital accumulation in
housing and mortgage lending in order to counteract the depressing effects of the highly
unequal distribution of income on the housing market, the construction industry, and
thus the overall economy.
In the long run, these attempts have not only failed to solve the housing problem,
but have actually generated some very serious economic and political problems. The
stability of the entire financial structure has become interwoven with the stability of
the huge residential mortgage debt—generated by the evolution of the mortgage system
-1*.
in conjunction with a housing market based upon repeated resale and refinancing of
housing. Since the mortgage payments on this debt constitute the biggest single compo-
nent of most families' housing costs—both for renters and homeowners—the increasing
difficulty in paying for the high cost of housing threatens the mortgage system—and the
resi of the financial system—with collapse. This linkage has made housing a significant
contributor to the ongoing economic crisis, and has made the housing sector especially
vulnerable to the crisis.
A .7 ay Out?
What then are the prospects, if the problem is as deep and the dangers as great as
I have suggested? The conservative solution can be called a "managed depression."
Conservatives argue correctly that there can be no solution to the housing crisis with-
out controlling inflation and that federal bailout of the housing industry will not really
solve the problem but will add to the federal deficit and to inflation. Their approach
therefore consists of continued tight money and high interest rates on the monetary
side; while on the fiscal side they provide tax curs for large corporations and wealthy
individuals to shield thern from austerity, while severely cutting housing and community
development, income maintenance, and social services spending in order to try to offset
the tax cuts and increased military spending.
The conservative approach might appear to some people to be no more than a
cynical attempt to protect big business and the wealthy from inevitable depression,
while to others—including some who may dislike or disagree with these polcies—it may
seem like a realistic attempt to avoid cataclysm. Yet ultimately the conservative
approach will fail because the high social costs it imposes and the obvious inequity in
the distribution of these costs will lead to rejection politically. True conservatives
have often had a fairly accurate understanding of the limits of liberal capitalism and
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have understood what is required economically to keep the system afloat. Their poli-
cies involve, though, a degree of sociai and economic injustice which simply has never
been tolerable for very long by the majority of Americans, and thus in the long run the
conservative approach will not ever be fully played out except under a far more author-
itarian regime than we yet have.
On the other hand, liberal policies, which have always had and will again have
greater political appeal, will lead unwittingly out inevitably to an unmanagea depres-
sion—to a genuine financial collapse—with uncertain but potentially terrifying social
and political consequences, with the understandable goals of relieving austerity, assur-
ing a little greater equity, and bailing out the gasping housing industry, the liberal
approach does involve increased federal spending to maintain most housing and ether
social programs and to provide .bailouts to distressed thrift institutions, builders and
homeowners, while only marginally increasing taxes and slowing the rate of growth of
military spending. Thus, despite their declarations of a commitment to cut the federal
deficit in order to reduce inflation and credit competition, the fiscal policies being
offered by liberals will almost certainly increase the federal deficit.
Liberal monetary demands involve of course an easing of tight money in order to
bring down interest rates and accommodate the credit demands of the federal govern-
ment without crowding out housing, consumer borrowing, state and local governments,
and other businesses. In the very short run, the effect would be a boost to the economy
and a reduction in defaults and bankruptcies by individuals and businesses, but soon
inflation and speculation would again stretch the credit bubble beyond real growth in
the economy making a crash even more likely than now.
The only sensible and workable alternative then to managed versus unmanaged
depression is one which goes beyond the conservative and liberal approaches and instead
begins to deal with underlying causes: maldistribution of income; overdependence on
16-
credit; and ownership and investment arrangements that encourage speculation (in hous-
ing and industry) rather than production, employment and social well-being.
A substantial amount of work has already been done and is continuing on the
development of policies and programs for dealing with these causes and their conse-
quences, both on an immediate emergency basis and in a long-term, more structural
way. For example, the Boston Urban Analysis Group several years ago devoted consi-
derable effort to formulating a comprehensive housing program with both local and
national elements (see Appendix 1 for their Housing Program Statement of Principles).
This effort largely shapec the platform of the All-City Housing Organization presented
in the soring of 1920, and more recently has informed the City Life Housing Platform
(see Appendix 2 for this platform). The Urban Analysis Group work has also provided
the basis nationally for the housing position statement of the Planners Network and the
development by the Institute for Poiicy Studies Housing Group of an Omnibus Housing
Bill which is expected to be introduced in Congress in the next session. The recently-
published collection America's Housing Crisis: What is to be Done? also incorporates
some of the results of these and ether efforts.
t
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A Housing Program for Boston
As a contributor to much of the above-mentioned work, in what follows I will just
be highlighting and building upon those elements that seem most appropriate for
consideration by the new Mayor and City Council in Boston. I will, in addition,
emphasize some local options for addressing the income side of the affordability
problem and suggest possible roles for local leaders in addressing the housing problem
and its causes at the state and national levels.
The set of local actions proposed for the housing market side of the problem are
grouped into five major categories:
I. Maintain and enhance the affordability of existing unsubsidized housing
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II. Facilitate the transfer of existing housing to non-speculative ownership
III. Preserve existing public and subsidized housing and enhance its afford-
abiiity for low and moderate households
IV. Support production of more housing for non-speculative ownership
V. Establish and enforce a local housing bill of rights
I. Maintain and Enhance the Affordability of Existing Unsubsidized Housing
Although mere than 2C percent of the housing uniis in Boston are subsidized, most
low and moderate income residents do not receive subsidies and are in need of measures
which can at least limit— If not reduce—the cost of their housing. Some such measures
can deal directly with the cost of housing, for renters and for homeowners. Others can
have the effect of reducing displacement of low- and moderate-income peopie, as
displacement usually results in both the loss of relatively lower-cost units and the
displacees paying more for whatever housing they eventually obtain. The following six
policies are proposed in this area:
A. Enact permanent rent, eviction and condominium conversion controls. As a member
of the Boston City Council, Mayor-elect Flynn introduced the Boston Home Protection
Act, which may now receive more serious consideration. Under the Act, vacancy
decontrol would be repealed, with the rents of recontrolled units set on the basis of
average citywide increases in operating and maintenance expenses and property taxes
since decontrol. Thus the rents of many units would be reduced below current levels. It
would allow increases in rents, but only for documented increases in operating expenses
and property taxes; there would be automatic rent reduction for code violations, tenant
consent for capital improvements other than to correct code violations, and capitaliza-
tion for the cost of repairs over their useful life. Exemptions from coverage would be
limited, and evictions for condominium conversion as well as conversions likely to result
in substantial displacement would not be permitted.
It is time to recognize rent and eviction controls as an integral and permanent
feature of local policy and regulation, anaiagous to zoning and housing codes. There is
no reason why a competent City administration cannot administer such regulations
efficiently and fairly. The principal difficulties of rent and eviction controls stem net
from their existence, but from uncertainty about their duration and inadequacies in
their administration. Recognizing that rent and eviction controls are not just step-gap
measures but nor are they the be-all of locai policy for rental housing, the City of
Boston should establish a system equivalent to that of Cambridge and 3rookiine and
then direct its energies more to other necessary housing policies.
B. Enact controls on the use of fire insurance proceeds by 3wners of rental housing.
Arson-for-profit has proven to be a terrifyingly effective way for some landlords to
deal with the income/housing cost squeeze. To stop this crime will require active
municipal and neighborhood monitoring of property transactions and landlord behavior,
of the sort carried out under the CAPES program. But it will also require elimination
of the financial incentives. The City administration should at least seek home rule
authority—and indeed lead statewide efforts—for fire insurance reform. There should
be limitations on the disbursement of fire insurance proceeds in the event of incendiary
or suspicious causes: the City should be a named loss payee, as mortgage holders are,
with the power to ensure and require that rental property be restored to a habitable
condition substantially equivalent to pre-fire and that a fire not be an excuse for
removal of the housing from the rent-controlled rental stock. In addition, landlords
should be required to have sufficient coverage to pay relocation expenses and housing
costs in excess of pre-fire for a period of one year for displaced tenants. These
measures, along with much greater commitment to criminal investigation, can help save
both affordable housing and human lives.
C. Enact a tax on the speculative turnover of housing. The most affordable housing is
that which has been held by the current owner for 10, 15, 20 years or more, so that the
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residents are not paying for speculative increases in values and financing at high rates
of interest. A useful tool for discouraging short-term ownership, dampening speculative
pressures, and also raising seme revenue is a local speculation tax.
While requiring state enabling legislation for such a local tax, Boston and other
municipalities should he able to craft an appropriate framework. The two basic
ingredients are the definition of speculative gain and the rate of taxation. Since the
state constitution requires a fiat rate of taxation, in order to diicoufcge short-term
holding and rapid turnover, the definition may involve a sliding scale: for example, in
.the first year, the entire gain ccuid oe defined as speculative; in the second year, 95
percent; in the third year, 90 percent; and so forth, so that property held mere than 20
years would be subject to no tax. Alternatively, any gain over and above the Consumer
Price Index increase for the ownership period could be defined as speculative. The rate
should then be as high as is constitutionally possible, with at least 70 percent being the
minimum for the tax to be effective.
D. Provide grants and low-interest loans for low- and moderate-income homeowners to
pay for reoairs and weatherization. The City has been using CD3G funds for over a
decade to assist homeowners under the Housing Improvement Program, with rebates of
20 percent, 40 percent, and 50 percent for categories of qualifying homeowners. The
program has had great impact, but several modifications may help with the affordabil-
ity situations of existing low-income owners and maintain long-term affordability of
some of the existing owner-occupied stock. Some owners cannot afford necessary
repairs and energy improvements at all; they should be able to receive outright grants
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for these costs, but with the imposition of a lien which requires repayment of the grant
if and when the owner or owner's heirs sell and with the right of first refusal to buy at
such time by the Community Housing and Land Trust (see below). Indeed, many
municipalities use CDBG funds for homeowner partial grants or rebates, with liens to
permit recovery and recycling of the funds when the property is soid. This proposal just
goes farther in order to address the more serious barrier to homeowner repairs while
serving longer-term objectives of removing housing from the speculative market in the
future.
E. Establish municipally-capitalized reverse annuity mortgages for lc" :-lncome elderly
homeowners. Reverse annuity mortgages are a mechanism which lending institutions
have begun to offer older homeowners who have paid off their mortgages and happen to
live in areas wiih rising and relatively high property values; the homeowner gets an
annuity for life, secured by the equity in the home and repaid after death out of the
owner's estate by sale or refinancing of the home. The City should investigate the
possibility of creating such a program for lower-income homeowners using municipal
borrowing or CDBG funds to make the annuity payments. The mortgage lien could
provide for the Community Housing and Land Trust to have right of first refusal to buy
from the owner's estate, with the share of annuity payments provided by CD3G funds
being used to write down the cost, as these funds would not have to be repaid.
Another version of this model would be for the Community Housing and Land
Trust, or other non-profit entity, to purchase the home of an elderly low-income
homeowner, offering in return a life estate and an annuity equal either to full housing
costs and the shelter poverty affordability cost of the seller. In this way, the resident
would be assured of life tenure at a truly affordable cost.
F. Support and provide foreclosure relief for low- and moderate-income homeowners.
The City should exercise its persuasive powers to encourage private lending institutions
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to exercise forbearance in foreclosing on unpaid mortgages on the homes of low- and
moderate-income homeowners, and should endorse state legislation to ensure maximum
forbearance and relief by lenders.
In addition, the City should explore establishing a foreclosure relief program
analogous to :ne program for elderly homeowners above, with sucn a program; the one
above of course requiring some public expenditures. For qualifying low-income
homeowners who have not been able to resume mortgage payments even after lender
forbearance, the City should use CD5G or ether funds to provide financial assistance
for one year, or perhaps at most, two years. The assistance should bring the
homeowners outlays down to the shelter poverty affordabiiity level, in return for which
whenever the owner wishes to sell, the Community Housing and Land Trust wiil have
the right to buy at a price yielding no more than a limited-equity return to the seller.
As an alternative version, if the owner is unable to resume full mortgage payments
within a specified time, the terms of the assistance could require that the owner deed
the property to the CHLT, subject to the mortgage, but with no cash payment, in return
for a life estate and permanent housing payments based on the shelter poverty
affordabiiity scale. For low-income homeowners facing the less of both their shelter
and their investment to foreclosure, this program provides security of tenure and
affordabiiity, but could not and shouid net use public dollars to buy out such owners at
market prices. As a voluntary program, people would always have the option of going
through foreclosure and taking their chances at the foreclosure auction.
II. Facilitate the Transfer of Existing Housing to Forms of Non-Speculative Ownership
Private rental housing is increasingly being recognized as an anachronism, at least
by those landlords who are converting to condos, abandoning their buildings or burning
them for the insurance money. To the extent that city policies make conversion and
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arson no longer available or profitable, and to the extent that tenant militancy has
increased the greater legal protection and municipal enforcement, landlords who wish
to bail out snould be able to do so in ways that are not harmful to tenants. Therefore,
mechanisms must be established—or existing mechanisms more fully utilized—so that
private rental housing can be converted to forms of social or non-speculative ownership,
such as non-equity or limited-equity coops, life estate condominiums (i.e., no possibility
of speculative resale but assured life tenure), ownership by community trusts, or public
ownership.
In order to achieve such Transfer of ownership without increasing rents yet
providing compensation to the former owner, it would be necessary first for the new
ownership entity to be able to assume any existing mortgages, perhaps with a
renegotiated interest rate plus restrictions on pre-sale refinancing or mortgaging at
inflated amounts (to pull out equity): second, the departing owner might receive not
cash but a mortgage for the agreed upon equity, with the monthly payment on this
mortgage not exceeding the cash flow the former owner realized (unless the old
mortgages could be renegotiated at lower rates, in which case the former owner could
get more, thus providing an incentive not to kite mortgages just before sale).
The private ownership, financing and disinvestment of rental housing is often
quite elaborate and bizarre, so there is great need for an improved legal framework, for
technical assistance, and strong tenant organizations to engage successfully in negotia-
tions for such property transfers. This approach will not of course provide the vital and
necessary resources to upgrade physically the multi-family buildings taken over—that
again will require public resources—but it will mean a reduced rate of rent increases,
retirement of much outstanding mortgage debt, and greatly increased resident and
community control over, responsibility for, and security in multi-family housing at very
little cost.
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In addition, some of the proposals offered to assist existing homeowners, as
mentioned above, should be iinked to future transfer to non-speculative ownership, so
that use of public resources for immediate individual affordability relief also serves a
broader and longer-term public purpose, namely permanent assurance of maximum
affordability for future residents.
Several specific measures which can go into a policy facilitating such transfer
include:
A. Support establishment of a Community Housing and Land Trust. This entity, already
referred to, should be set up as a non-profit, charitable foundation, with neighborhood
boards democratically chosen, it should be able to receive properties and to upgrade
them, in some cases for permanent ownership and management or, where feasible, for
eventual transfer to other non-profit or non-speculative forms of resident ownership.
Single-family as well as multi-family housing can enter into this process, as there is no
reason why limited-equity and community repurchase stipulations cannot be attached to
single-family dwellings, just as they are being applied to coops and condominiums.
3. Transfer City-owned property, which is tax-foreclosed, condemned or surplus, to the
CHLT rather than auctioning it off bac< into the speculative market. Some legal
changes may be necessary to facilitate this process, but the City has considerable
administrative discretion.
C. Link homeowner relief programs to future acquisition by the CHLT, as already
mentioned.
D. Make greater use of condemnation and receivership provisions of the Sanitary Code.
With the existence of a Community Housing and Land Trust, and with the cooperation
of the Boston Housing Court, the City should much more vigorously act to enforce the
codes in buildings where landlords have been negligent and should act to remove control
from such landlords.
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E. Support acquisition by BH^ of some existing one- to four-family homes on a
scattered site basis to house large low-income families, with emphasis on community-
assistance and resident self-help to further reduce housing costs as well as promote
other social objectives,
F. Provide City funds and CDBG to help cover the overhead costs of the Community
Housing and Land Trust and other non-profit entities that acquire and manage housing
for non-speculative ownership.
III. Preserve existing Public and Subsidized Housing and Enhance Its Affordabiiity
Over 20 percent of housing in Boston is under subsidy, either through the Boston
Housing Authority or is privately owned but government-assisted. While some complain
that Boston has too much subsidized housing, the extent of shelter poverty reveals the
need both for more subsidized units and for subsidies more appropriate to need. Yet at
the same time, there are factors working to reduce the amount of assisted housing,
factors which the City administration will need to oppose if the housing affordability
problem is not to worsen. The City itself has limited power over most subsidized
housing, but the following represent some elements that may comprise a policy of
support for the preservation and improvement of this vital resource:
A. Support the upgrading of existing public housing. Under court receivership, the
Boston Housing Authority has begun substantial efforts to improve existing public
housing. However, in some cases there is the possibility that the housing will be turned
over to private ownership, with the risk that it will not always be for low-income
residents. Also, the process of redevelopment has involved a substantial reduction in
the total number of units in many of the developments. The City should therefore make
every effort to assure that there is no sale or transfer of public housing, except perhaps
to non-profit or non-speculative resident ownership with permanent restriction to low-
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income use. Also, the BHA should be encouraged and assisted to provide lor at leasi
one-for-one replacement (in some instances, at other sites) for units unavoidably lest
through redevelopment. The City should also commit a proportion of CD3G funds to
public housing not just in proportion to the fraction of ali housing units in the city, but
rather the fraction ail low- and moderate-income households.
3. Resist the sale of HUD-foreclosed housing developments except to non-profit ov
non-soecuiative resident ownership. The City may have some direct leverage over the
disposition of subsidized developments in urban renewal areas and should exercise this
legal authority to ensure that these developments remain both subsidized and out of the
speculative market. In other instances where there is not direct legal power in tne
hands of the City, political leadership plus technical assistance to non-profit and
resident groups interested in taking over the housing should be provided.
C. Advocate and support -changes in the rent formulas for public and subsidized
housing, aiong with adequate operating subsidies. The shelter poverty scale reveals that
especially the larger and lower income families in public and subsidized housing are
paying more than they can afford, despite the subsidies, while some of the smaller
households with incomes approaching the income limits could indeed afford to pay
somewhat more. The most immediate way of making the housing more affordable and
making more appropriate allocation of subsidy funds on the basis of true need would be
to change the definition of income used in determining tenant rents. Efforts are well
along at the Congressional level to change the definition of income to provide for per-
person deductions (rather than the traditional deductions per minor child only) and make
these deductions at least $600 per person. With tenants paying 30 percent of their
income net of these deductions, the larger and lower income families in subsidized
housing would actually pay as much as $30 a month less than they did under the pre-
Reagan 25 percent of income formulas. Smaller and higher income households would
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pay more than under the old 25 percent formulas but less than under the new federal
formulas.
Again, the City does not have a direct role in establishing these rent formulas, but
it can participate actively with others in seeking such changes, along with increased
appropriations for operating subsidies so that enhanced affcrdabiiity does not occur at
the expense of even greater reductions in necessary maintenance of the housing.
IV. Support Production of More Housing for Non-Speculative Ownership
It is all too easy to say that the^e ought to be more federal and state funds for the
production of suosidized housing. 5ome increases are not unlikely over tne next few
years, and the City obviously should aggressively seek more than its share, especially of
state and federal public housing dollars. There are some types of local initiative,
though, which are possible and which should also be pursued aggressively, rather than
placing ail hope and blame on the state and federal coffers:
A. Enact linkage legislation with the funds targetted for development of non-
speculative housing. Linkage has clearly become a widely recognized and supported
concept in Boston, with the Mayor-elect and many members of the City Council already
having participated in the promotion of the concept. The principal debates now are
over the rate to be charged developers and the allocation of the funds for neighborhood
housing production. I will not enter into the debate over the rate to be charged
developers, but will simply reiterate the obvious point that charging developers a fee of
$5 per gross square foot as an initial payment, rather than spread over 12 years, is not
likely to impose a substantial disincentive to development, but certainly will provide
much greater neighborhood benefit and much sooner.
Of more direct relevance for the context of this paper is the allocation of the
linkage funds. It should be clear that the greatest long-term impact on affordability
-27-
will be achieved by targetting the resources for use in rehabilitation or new construc-
tion for non-profit or non-speculative resident ownership. Indeed, the Community
Housing and Land Trust and community-based housing developers are the logical
recipients.
5. SuDDort an end to court-imposed restriction on develooment of new c-ubiic housing.
As part of the receivership, the BHA has been required to focus on revitalizing existing
public housing, and quite properly so. vi/:th the g r eat need for additional units, and with
redeveiooment eliminating some public housing units even as it brings others back into
habitable condition, it is time to exnar.d the stock of nubile housing. The new Citv
adminisxraiion snould iry to use its good offices to get tne court to permit the BHA to
seek financing for additional public housing.
C. Use CPBG funds for seed money anc technical assistance for community-based
developers, and, resources permitting, for capital grants and low-interest loans, While
the claims on CDBG funds are great, the challenge is to focus the funds in ways that
will have the greatest benefit for those most in need. Such funds certainly will not go
very far if used for capital grants, even though such grants can have the greatest
impact on what residents end up having to pay for newly built or substantially rehabbed
housing. More broadly distributed funds may seem like a more equitable approach in
the short run but may also have little long-term impact unless used to facilitate
institutional change rather than just provide financial assistance. Thus whatever
limited funds are provided to assist housing production should contribute to increasing
the amount of housing under permanent community, public, or non-speculative resident
ownership.
D. Explore the use of a portion of municipal pension funds for financing new
construction and substantial rehab of housing. Pension funds are discussed with
increasing frequency as a potential pool of funds not yet significantly tapped for
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housing. They certainiy do not offer the potential of providing funds that are much
cheaper than other sources, but at the municipal level (as well as the state level and by
unionized workers) they do offer the possibility of using a portion of localiy-generaied
resources for the direct benefit of the community. Since the funds would be used in the
form of loans and at competitive interest rates, the oniv way in which such money could
help to alleviate the affordabiiity problem is on a long-term basis by having funds
targetted, as with other sources mentioned above, for housing that remains outside of
inflating property values and costly refinancing.
V. Establish a Local Housing 3iii of Rights
A number of the proposals which have been presented would increase the rights of
residents in various ways and indeed begin to move toward the notion of affordaoie
housing as an entitlement. It is therefore worth considering bringing these various
measures together into a package which legally affirms and codifies the elements which
are scattered in various laws and regulations. But even if this were not possible
statutorily, the City government could certainly prepare materials and provide services
in a way that interconnects the various rights residents have. Expressed in this way,
the major tenets of such a program would be as follows:
A. Enact statutory life tenure (eviction protection) under the Home Protec-
tion Act for all tenants who continue to pay their rent and do not
interfere with the rights of other tenants.
B. Establish life estate security for homeowners under the reverse annuity
and foreclosure relief programs.
C. Strictly enforce the State Sanitary Code, with community and resident
participation, use of condemnation where appropriate, and encourage-
ment that the Housing Court use the Community Housing and Land Trust
as receiver.
D. Legislatively recognize the right of tenants to form unions and bargain
collectively.
E. Strengthen the enforcement powers of the Fair Housing Commission.
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F. Provide public education, outreach, publicity and technical assistance to
housing residents and groups on t
them individually and collectively
heir housing rights and how to exercise
Apart from these measures aimed specifically at the housing market, there are a
number of things local officials can undertake to enhance housing affordability from the
income side. Most local officials are always working to bring in and create new jobs for
residents, and this will of course continue. It is possible to have at least as great a
positive impact, though, on the income of Boston residents through efforts directed at
job access anc the structure of existing jobs.
Job access ociicies certainly induce efforts to improve the Quality and availaoii-
ity of education and training. They a:so should involve the reaffirmation and
strengthening of a policy of Boston 3obs for Boston Residents and support for
affirmative action (and not only for jobs where city government has direct leverage*.
The local administration can also undertake efforts to increase access to suburban job
opportunities, through the support of improvements to existing transportation systems
and development of special job-oriented transportation links.
Job creation and job access endeavors, as important as they are, will do little to
solve the housing affordability problems of Bostonians if the jobs are of low wage and
with little or no prospect for improvement. Local government therefore needs to look
at its own internal job structures and provide models and exercise political influence to
alter private-sector employment. Unionization is an essential institution for workers
themselves to participate in establishing not only their immediate wages but also career
development and training opportunities; local government leaders can help create a
climate which supports workers' rights to unionize and utilize their unions in these
ways. Comparable worth is a concept whose time is long overdue; the Mayor-elect's
commitment to the concept should not only improve the incomes of women workers,
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especially in city government, but can provide an example for the private sector in
Boston. Finally, city government can directly develop itself and assist other employers
in developing career ladders and job upgrading programs, both to help individual workers
improve their situations and also to restructure jobs, so that tnere is enhancement of
the prevailing level of skill and productivity as well as of income.
In closing, I want to emphasize that imaginative and aggressive municipal leaders
can begin to have an impact on the housing problem and its causes at the state and
national levels in a number of forums, such as: testifying and lobbying; participating in
national organizations of mayors and municipalities; contributing to party platforms;
speaking before and providing educational materials to housing and community develop-
ment advocacy and professional groups.
While all of these areas of activity are fairly obvious, the potentially original
element is the content. Rather than arguing primarily for increased dollars and local
control—as important these are—what our muncipal leaders can offer that is most
significant is, first, our local models for housing action and institutional change, and
secondly, persuasive arguments on the seriousness of the crisis and passionate support
of the following type for dealing with the crisis:
1. Cut the federal deficit and begin to distribute income downward by:
a) cutting military spending;
b) repealing the tax cut enacted in 1981;
c) closing tax loopholes including housing-related tax benefits;
d) eliminating the federal income tax for low-income households; and
e) explicitly targetting housing and economic development subsidies and
incentives to entities that engage in productive and non-speculative
investment.
2. Impose credit controls and credit allocation in order to:
a) deflate the credit bubble;
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b) cut credit for speculation; and
c) assure an adequate supply of low-cost credit for productive invest-
ment in housing construction and rehabilitation, rebuilding decaying
infrastructure, and creation of job-producing industry.
3. Control prices through a combination of:
a) explicit controls;
b) use of federal and state tax cedes to penalize speculation; ^ind
c) incentives to transfer housing, land anc enterprise into forms oi non-
speculative (resident, community, worker, consumer, public) owner-
ship.
Boston leaders are uniquely equipped
also to advocate broader policies such as tnese to begin dealing with the roots of the
housing Droblem while avoiding imoending economic disaster.
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APPENDIX 1:
BOSTON URBAN ANALYSIS GROUP HOUSING PROGRAM:
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
1. Social Ownership
Control and eventually eliminate speculative private ownership of housing; while
conserving, upgrading, and exoanding the amount of housing under public, com-
munity, and non-speculative resident ownership.
2. Social Production
Upgrade and expand the housing supply; increase social control over ail aspects of
housing production; and maximize resident and neighborhood benefits from the
production process.
3. Public Financing
Reduce and eventually eliminate the dependence of housing production, improve-
ment, and exchange on credit (especially borrowing from private financial
institutions), and increase pubic control of housing finance capital.
k. Resident Control
Control the destructive impact of profit-motivated decision-making on lower-
income residents and their communities, and increase resident control over
housing, land use, and development decisions at the building, block, neighborhood
and community level, as appropriate. Resident control is to occur within the
framework of appropriate social objectives, including non-exclusionary principles
and responsiveness to user needs.
5. Equitable Resource Allocation
Increasingly allocate resources for housing and neighborhoods based on need and
for purposes that directly benefit and improve the quality of life for lower income
residents.
6. Affirmative Action
Control and eventually eliminate the discriminatory, exclusionary, and oppressive
uses of housing, particularly in relation to racial minorities and women; and take
affirmative steps to improve the quality of life for existing residents of minority
communities, recognizing the benefits of social cohesiveness as well as the need
to expand housing choices for oppressed groups.
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7. Adequate Resources
Provide increasingly adequate resources for housing and neighborhood needs by
reallocating existing tax revenues away from socially harmful purposes, elimina-
ting regressive forms of tax avoidance, and instituting new progressive taxes on
individual and corporate incomes and wealth.
S. Adequate Incomes
Ensure thai everyone able to work is guaranteed a aecent job with an income
sufficient to meet shelter and non-shelter needs at a reasonable standard of
living, and that people unable to work are guaranteed an equivalent income to
achieve the sar^e i'vin~ "-ta^dard.
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APPENOIX 2:
CITY LIFE HOUSING PLATFORM FOR BOSTON
Affordable housing in Boston is disappearing fast. Long-term residents are being
displaced. Working class and minority communities are being uprooted. Badly-needed
housing is being abandoned, torn down, or burned down. To address this immediate
crisis, City Life calls for the following:
TO STOP DISPLACEMENT CAUSED BY RENT INCREASES AND CONDOMINIUM
CONVERSIONS:
1) A stiff tax on profits made by speculation. This will discourage real estate
"investors" from buying buildings cheap and reselling them at high prices with
little or no improvements.
2) A ban on condominiums. Resident-owned housing cooperatives should be
allowed, but must be regulated to prevent individual apartments from being re-
sold at speculative prices.
3) Permanent, strong rent control , including:
- coverage of all rental units.
- a Rent Control Board composed of elected representatives of tenants,
homeowners, and absentee landlords according to the proportion of the
Boston population that each group makes up. Since two-thirds of city
residents are tenants, two-thirds of the Board members would be tenants.
- adequate funding and powers to guarantee enforcement of rent control rules.
TO PROTECT TENANTS ORGANIZING FOR BETTER CONDITIONS:
4) Recognition of the rights of tenants to form unions , to go on rent strike when
the landlords violate the law, and to win collective bargaining agreements with
property owners.
5) Strict enforcement of the State Sanitary (Housing) Code , especially in ab-
sentee-owned buildings.
6) Eviction controls to prevent landlords from evicting tenants in order to get
higher rents or to stop tenants from defending their rights.
TO PROTECT WORKING CLASS HOMEOWNERS:
7) Grants and low-interest loans for weatherization and repairs to low and
moderate-income homeowners.
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3) An alternative to foreclosure for homeowners who can't make their mortgage
payments. Instead of losing their homes, they should have the option of turning
over title to their house to the Community Housing and Land Trust (see point
15). They would lose the right to sell their house, but could remain living in it
for as long as they chose.
TO SAVE PUBLIC AMD GOVERNMENT-SUBSIDIZED HOUSING:
9) Upgrading of all public housing projects. No demolitions and no transfers of
public housing projects to private developers or institutions.
lGj No more sales oi HUD-owned cro-ects to ^rcfit—makin^ landlords. Immediate
foreclosure oi government-subsidized projects whose owners fail to repay loans
or to provide °ocd main:enance and security at affordable rents.
TO END HOUSING DISCRIMINATION:
11) Adoption and enforcement of strong laws against discrimination by landlords
and housing authorities on the basis of race. sex. sexual preference, number of
children, or physical disability,
TO SAVE HOUSING FROM ARSON, ABANDONMENT, AND DESTRUCTION 3Y
SLUMLORDS:
12) No payment of fire insurance to absentee landlords except for the purpose of
repairing fire-damaged ouildings for the tenants who were there before the fire
or for providing damages and comparable housing at the same or lower rents to
tenants forced to move by fire.
13) No more auctions or sales of city-owned property to profit-making landlords or
developers. Instead, this property should be transferred to the Community
Housing and Land Trust (see point 15).
1*0 Takeover of the property of absentee landlords who repeatedly violate the law
in any of the following ways:
- committing arson
- failing to make repairs
- failing to provide heat and other services
- failing to pay property taxes
- failing to abide by rent control and eviction regulations
These buildings should then be transferred to the Community Housing and Land
Trust.
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TO REDEVELOP RUN-DOWN HOUSING AND VACANT BUILDINGS AND LAND TO
MEET COMMUNITY NEEDS:
15) Establishment of a Community Housing and Land Trust for Boston with local
neighborhood boards elected by the residents of each community. The CHLT
Boards would have the power and the funds to:
- transfer vacant houses to low- and moderate-income owner occupants, along
with full back tax abatements, low-interest loans, and technical rehab
assistance. In exchange, the new owners must agree to remain living in tneir
houses or, if they move, to resell the house to the CHLT for a price that
allows them to recover their cost but not make a profit.
- transfer vacant or foreclosed buildings and land to tenant cooperatives or
non-profit community development corporations, with safeguards to prevent
any future resale for profit.
- rehab and operate buildings as community- and tenant-controlled quality
public housing.
16) Funds for protecting, repairing, and building affordable housing should be
obtained by the foiiowing means:
- replacement of taxes on residential property with a steeply graduated state
income tax. Pending this, a tax should be collected on incomes over $35,000
made in the City of Boston.
- collection of the $140 million in back property taxes owed to the City, with
priority on collection from commercial property owners and absentee land-
lords.
,
- elimination of property tax breaks now given by the City to profit-making
corporations, universities, and hospitals.
- federal funds to the City of Boston which are now being used to promote
development of luxury hotels, shopping areas, and other profit-making
projects should instead be spent to improve housing and neighborhoods for
working class residents.
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NOTE5
1 Extensive discussion of the logic of housing affordabiiity. the procedures used to
operationalize the sliding scale, plus comparison with other aiiordabiiity scales, is
contained in Michael E. Stone, Shelter Poverty; New Ideas on Housing A jfordability
{Albany: State University of New York Press, forthcoming), Chapter 3.
- The most controversial aspect of using the BL5 Lower Budget is whether they
provide a reasonable definition of a minimal level of adequacy. The BL5 itself has
The iower-stanaard ouzget will represent a minimum ci acequacy ....line
lower-standard budgets are expected to be more appropriate than the
moderate budget for use in establishing goals for public assistance and
income maintenance programs in the current decade.
• c
By contrast, the cover statements accompanying the published sets cf family and
elderly budgets since the early 1970's have included such statements as: "The
budgets are not intended to represent a minimum or subsistence level of living," or
"The budgets are not intended to represent a minimum levei of adequate income or a
subsistence level of income".
The change in the official 3LS interpretation of the Lower Budgets undoubtedly
reflects the retreat by the federal government from a commitment to substantial
income redistribution necessary for an income maintenance program with a reason-
ably adequate minimum support level. Since this retreat was associated with the
growing economic difficulties of the U.S. since the late i960's and with the change
of administration in 1969, the published disclaimers must be discounted somewhat on
political and ideological grounds. At the same time, though, there are some
conceptual and methodological problems associated with the BLS Budgets, but no
operational alternative has yet been put into piace. In 197S, the Bureau began a
project to revise the Family Budget Program; an Expert Committee on Family
Budget Revisions was established, but its final draft report—New American Budget
Standards
,
completed in May, 1980, with the assistance of the Institute for Research
on Poverty of the University of Wisconsin/Madison and the Center for the Social
Sciences at Columbia University—was never published or acted upon. The analysis
summarized here and presented in detail in Shelter Poverty
,
op. cit. , has thus been
carried out using the BLS Lower Budgets, recognizing certain limitations but hoping
that it will contribute to rekindling debate on income distribution and the definition
of a minimum adequate standard of living.
The Reagan Administration has decided to eliminate the BLS Family Budget
Program beginning in fiscal year 1983; this means that the last published budgets
will be for Autumn, 1981. Unless and until the Program is revived or a new one
established, it will be necessary to update the budgets by applying the Consumer
OS-
Price Index for specific items to the various budget components, in the same way
that the BLS itself has updated the budgets.
The 1983 affordability scale for Boston has thus been derived from the BLS Lower
Budget for 1981, each budget component by using the increase in the Boston CPI for
the corresponding component from September, 1981 to September, 1983.
3 The figures on the incidence of shelter poverty in Boston in 1930 are from James F.
Flynn, The Need for Public Housing in Boston (Boston: Community Service Program,
College of Public and Community Service, University of Massachusetts/Boston,
1981), based upon application of the 19S0 shelter poverty affordability scale to
housing cost cross-tabulations from the Boston Household Survey conducted for the
BRA by the U/Mass Center for Survey Research.
* The most recent published version of this analysis is in Michael £. Stone, "Housing
and the Economic Crisis: An Analysis and Emergency Program," in Chester
Hartman, ed., America's Housing Crisis: What is to be Done? (Boston: Routiedge
and Kegan Paul, 1983).
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